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Background1
 
In the decade from 1983 to 1993, New Zealand farming moved from a 
relatively high income, protected, low-risk environment, to a low 
income, unprotected environment in which industry now carries the 
risks. 
Walker and Bell (1994), chapter 4. 
 
Creating a regulatory framework that enables open entry of farmers, 
processors and marketers will foster the the next stage in the development of 
the dairy industry in New Zealand …. 
Adrian Orr (Introduction to Watershed for New Zealand Dairy Industry,  
2001) 
 
Significant structural change in the New Zealand dairy industry, has taken place in 
two steps. Beginning in the early 1980s deregulation of the economy and 
agriculture in general materially affected the dairy industry. Then in 2001 a 
second major deregulatory step was taken that entailed the removal of the 
industry’s (single-desk) exclusive right to export. This had happened to other 
agricultural and horticulatural industries, but  for dairy it posed particular issues 
and affected a much larger industry. The dairy industry will continue to evolve 
but, under present regulatory settings, this will occur as a result of owner 
perogatives in competive national and international markets, rather than on the 
basis of specific New Zealand regulatory intervention. 
 
New Zealand’s first dairy export occurred in the 1840s with a consignment of 
cheese from Banks Peninsula to Australia. From the outset the cooperative form 
of ownership of processing was important. During last century when there were 
                                                 
1  I am indebted to Lisa Ryan for her able research assistance. Information was provided by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry.  
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many small dairy manufacturing companies the New Zealand government sought 
to garner economies of scale in international marketing of exports by enabling the 
establishment of producer and marketing boards in a form that cemented the 
cooperative form of ownership.  From 1945, Britain absorbed the bulk of New 
Zealand’s meat and dairy exports, with guaranteed access and good terms of trade.  
New Zealand’s agriculture producers were sheltered from international markets 
and competition, and the country developed a high standard of living under 
favourable conditions.  When Britain joined the European Community in 1972, 
however, access to the British market became limited, exposing New Zealand 
exporters to the need to find other markets for the first time.  Leading up to entry 
Britain had negotiated tariff quotas for sheep and dairy products that enabled entry 
of some New Zealand product after this time, but these were fixed and their 
prospective security was uncertain. In the 1970s consequent market diversification 
generally entailed lower and more volatile returns. From the 1940s to the  onset of 
the reforms in 1984, government protection of the manufacturing sector with 
import quotas and tariffs had resulted in a high cost structure for agriculture, and 
drew substantial transfers to maintain production of export commodities.  In 1984, 
the level of government support to the sector was around 30 percent of total 
agricultural sales.  This policy direction resulted in higher, but inefficient, 
production (with inefficient use of subsidised products, services and land). It 
misdirected incentives for farmers to focus on production of goods that received 
the highest government support, reducing the competitiveness of New Zealand 
farmers in international markets and concentrating the risk of poor farming 
decisions solely on the government. Such policy was possible because New 
Zealand governments had, since the 1930s, held direct control of many aspects of 
the economy, including rights to import, and wage, price, and foreign exchange 
rates. The system did not react flexibly to the oil price shocks of the 1970s, during 
which decade the government materially extended the terms of the welfare state 
(see Evans, Grimes, Wilkinson and Teece (1996)). 
 
New Zealand farmers faced a crisis by 1984 with high domestic inflation 
increasing costs coupled with declining terms of trade.  Production had expanded 
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in large part as a result of subsidies that encouraged extra production of (typically) 
standard commodities without shoring up sector incomes.2 By the early 1980s 
transfers to farmers had shifted to include raising farm incomes.  The agricultural 
sector’s predicament was not isolated.  Private and public debt combined reached 
95 percent of GDP in June 1984, resulting in a downgrading of the country’s 
sovereign debt rating and contributing to a foreign exchange crisis at the time of 
the election in 1984 when the 4th Labour government came to office.  The new 
government’s budget in November 1984 announced dramatic reforms to be 
introduced.  The agriculture sector was to become entirely exposed to 
international competition with the removal of government support and much 
reduced direct government involvement  in business.  Tariffs were scheduled for 
very significant reduction, the exchange rate was floated in March 1985, and 
monetary policy targetted inflation that was then running at more than 10%.  
Exposure to the consequent very high interest and exchange rates coupled with the 
withdrawal of subsidies was a shock to New Zealand farmers who had previously 
been largely isolated from international market prices, faced controlled, even 
subsidised interest rates, and whose production decisions before the reforms were 
based more on areas of government support than on international consumer 
demands. The new direction of economic policy as applied by the government of 
the mid 1980s across all industries and some areas of government was achieved 
because all sectors were getting the same treatment thereby changing the balance 
of interests of special interest groups: farming leaders for example, supported the 
removal of import restrictions and tariffs on manufactured goods and at the same 
time the removal of subsidies to agriculture.3
 
The withdrawal of government supports combined with the high exchange rate 
and high interest rates had a severe effect on farmers early in the reforms.  Farm 
land prices and profits dropped substantially as costs rose and incomes fell, with 
                                                 
2 For example, as occurred with suspensory loans for the development of hitherto undeveloped land. This had 
the effect of encouraging extra output – even from otherwise economically unviable land -  rather than 
supporting farmers’ incomes: in otherwords the marginal user cost was lower than the average user cost as a 
result of the form of many of the subsidies. 
3 See Evans and Richardson (2002) for the policy credibility argument as an explanation of New Zealand’s 
unilateral reduction of tariffs. 
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some farmers forced to sell parts of their farms and other farmers going bankrupt.  
Farmers’ spending decreased dramatically in response to these conditions, with a 
spin-off effect on rural service industries and communities.  In addition, the 
recession following the equity market shock of October 1987, which was 
particularly severe in New  Zealand, affected the whole economy, not just 
agriculture. It includes the, by this time, dwindling de-regulated manufacturing 
sector. Regulations that had restricted competition in agricultural supply of 
services were eliminated and, although areas of agriculture were struggling by the 
early 1990s, there was entry and restructuring of transport, meat packing plants 
and services attuned to other products such as forestry and horticuture.  The 
deregulation of the labour market in 1991, by a recently elected National 
government, represented by the Employment Contracts Act: facilitated further 
flexible and, for New Zealand, innovative arrangements and activites that lowered 
costs and otherwise assisted the progress of de-regulated agriculture.  
 
Agriculture was also affected by the replacement of town and country planning 
legislation with the Resource Management Act in 1991. This Act sought to control 
effects rather than activities and to allow a community voice in decisions. The 
criterion for the assessment of effects was to be close to that of economic 
efficiency taking intangibles properly into account. 
 
The Sweep of Change 1984-2003 
 
Agriculture is still an important part of New Zealand’s economy, although now 
much less so than in the period prior to the country’s reforms.  In the 1960s, 
agricultural commodities accounted for 90 percent of New Zealand’s export 
earnings, but now contribute less than 50 percent.  However, dairy products made 
up 21 percent of merchandise export earnings in 2003, followed by meat at 16 
percent and forestry at 10 percent (Statistics New Zealand, 2003), showing that 
agriculture is still an important component of the country’s exports. Much of New 
Zealand’s other exports depend upon agricultural ingredients. 
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 The change in profitability and product mix of New Zealand agriculture is 
indicated in the information provided by the figures reported in the Appendix. 
Agriculture is, on the face of it, much as it was, but this, and the figures, belie the 
changes that have taken place.  These changes reflect that costs and benefits of 
activities in agriculture are based upon, to a close extent, their real resource cost 
and returns provided by consumer demand. They have had the following effects in 
New Zealand4
• A substantial change in product mix as farmers bear the consequences of 
their decisions under market prices and costs and respond accordingly (see 
Figures A1, A2, A6, A7 and A8 of the Appendix); 
• Substantial improvement in product quality as subsidies tied to “old” 
products no longer exist, and deregulation of the labour market, transport 
and other services facilitate enhanced activities,5 
• While there remain environmental issues, 6 the overuse of fertiliser and of 
steep unsuitable land that accompanied subsidies to 1984 has gone, much 
of the less productive steeper land has been withdrawn from sheep and 
beef and planted in production forestry (see Figures A7 and A8),   
• The relaxation of the distinction between urban and rural brought about by 
the change to the Resource Management Act, combined with the economic 
viability of different activities, and advances in communication technology 
has led to a tighter, some would say, more concordant, blend of urban and 
rural. Farms near and far from cities have been restructured to provide, in 
some cases smaller, in other cases larger, farms and in many cases small 
properties for those seeking to live in (formerly) rural areas.7 Some of this 
change reflects the very significant product switch that has taken place to 
                                                 
4  Most would argue, and evidence suggests, that New Zealand has a comparative advantage in areas of 
agriculture agriculture that is reflected in New Zealand’s low cost of supply despite its distance from all other 
markets, and thus some of these changes would not be transferable to other countries. In particular, such areas 
would include: the production of sheep, some beef, and milk solids, forestry and some horticulture. 
5  Lamb meat production is higher now with an approximately 40% smaller  flock. The value per lamb is 
higher today in real terms as lamb has been transformed to a value-added product, than was the case in  1984 
(for indicators see Figures A4, A5, A6 and A9 of the Appendix). 
6  These issues relate to lake and stream pollution and greenhouse gas issues. They too will have been 
mitigated by the reduction in subsidies aimed at increased production of existing goods and services. 
7  The census of 1996 was the first to record net migration to the rural areas in very many decades. 
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relatively labour intensive horticultural crops, vineyards and tourism, but it 
also reflects a demand for lifestyle and ability and willingness to farm in 
more populous settings. 
• Finally, farmers and horticulturalists of all kinds seem to be adopting a 
portfolio approach to their activities. Specialisation occurs with large 
enterprises – as in farms of all sorts and vineyards – but smaller less 
specialised properties that diversify products and services are common. 
The range of products include those of agriculture and horticulture, but 
importantly recreation and tourism services. Tourism in New Zealand has 
grown to be the country’s largest export earner, and services provided in 
association with other more traditionally agricultural products by 
otherwise agricultural entities are important in this growth.  Further, the 
tourism and recreational elements, and the demand for country lifestyles, 
of the product mix has promoted agriculturalists’ interests in enhancing the 
environment of the countryside.  
 
The New Zealand experience of subsidy-free agriculture has demonstrated that 
farming in a de-regulated environment is feasible, and yields a portfolio of 
activites associated with better resource allocation; within the sector and among 
sectors. It also demonstrates that the deregulation of other sectors, including 
agricultural service sectors, played an important role in the performance of 
agriculture. 
 
The structural reform of  agriculture was not complete by the 1990s. While all 
farm types had had their subsidies removed there remained producer boards that 
had various centralised functions. These typically were involved in marketing and 
otherwise managing farm products, instituting research and limited the rights of 
companies to export on their own account. The New Zealand Dairy Board was the 
most important of these. Its prime function was to market internationally New 
Zealand manufactured dairy products that were produced by cooperative dairy 
companies. It was owned by these companies. It held the statutory right to be the 
“single-desk” seller of dairy products manufactured in New Zealand. Its other 
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functions included research and the administration of advisory and genetic 
development services to dairy farmers. It also represented the political interest 
group of dairy farmers. 
New Zealand Dairy Reform 
 
In 1882, the first refrigerated shipment of meat and butter went to London aboard 
the ‘Dunedin’, the beginning of a long period of a good export relationship with 
Britain.  The first co-operative cheese company was established on the Otago 
Peninsula in 1871 and by the early 20th century most dairy factories were owned 
by co-operatives.  The government established the Dairy Produce Export Control 
Board (which later became the New Zealand Dairy Board) in 1923 to control all 
dairy exports, on the argument that local processing companies were too small to 
export efficiently on theor own account.  Four years later, the marketing of New 
Zealand butter and cheese in Britain began with the establishment of 
Amalgamated Dairies in London by several of New Zealand’s dairy companies. 
The New Zealand Dairy Board had its single-desk export status conferred on it by 
legislation in 1961.  
 
From as early as the 1930s, ongoing mergers and acquisitions had been occurring 
among cooperative dairy companies: indeed between 1933 and 2001 the number 
of cooperative dairy companies fell from 499 to 4. In common with other farm 
types, rapid inflation in dairy farm land values began in the 1970s, peaking in the 
early 1980s8 and reflecting government subsidies.  Following the reforms from 
1984, the removal of subsidies resulted in farm prices falling to a 23-year low in 
real value (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 1996). 
 
Particularly from the 1970s demands grew to rationalise the structure of the dairy 
industry as companies sought further economies of scale and better coordination 
of production and marketing.  A particular difficulty was the market signals for 
                                                 
8 This refers to land values in the Waikato and Canterbury.  See Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (1996) 
Section 7.0. 
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farmers imparted by the bundled price they received for their milk that did not 
distinguish the production cost of raw milk from return on milk-processing 
capital, and generally led to over production.  Furthermore the single-desk export 
restriction limited domestic competition, particularly when the number of 
cooperatives had shrunk to 4. The New Zealand domestic market for milk and 
milk products is so small any entrant would have to export to expand and this 
would require permission from is cooperative competitors that owned the Dairy 
Board. These were among the factors that motivated various interests to encourage 
structural change and remove the single desk export status in dairy. 
 
The following table shows that, in May 2001 the sets of supply arrangements were 
internalised within the vertically integrated structure that constituted the industry.  
In it, the Board was owned by manufacturing co-operatives that were in turn 
owned by farmers.  The table illustrates that product-value enhancing research and 
development could be carried out by both the Board and supplying co-operatives 
and that milk-product supply contracts would have to allocate returns from this 
activity between these entities. 
 
Although the general form of the structure had been in place for some 40 years, its 
operation was not settled.  In 1999, a proposal entailing the merger of the four co-
operatives and the Board had, in a draft decision of the Commerce Commission9, 
been indicated to be unacceptable under the Commerce Act 1986.  The 
appearance of the proposal reflected various pressures on the existing single-desk 
export-monopoly structure, some from foreign governments regarding the export 
monopoly status of the Board, and other reflecting dissatisfaction on the part of 
the co-operatives and the Board with the operational position of the industry.  At 
least as early as 1998 the Board was very concerned about attempts to circumvent 
is statutory sole export rights, potentially by its own large shareholders. The 
structure that may have survived diffuse shareholdiing represented by many 
cooperatives was placed under operational and performance stress when owned, in 
                                                 
9  The Commerce Commmission is New Zealand’s competition law monitoring and enforcement institution. 
Since 2000 it has also held regulatory functions. 
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essence by a duopoly, in the 1990s. Competition among cooperatives in the 
domestic market had some credence when there were many of them, albeit much 
of their output went to the New Zealand Dairy Board. But with essentially only 
two very large cooperatives meaningful competition and development could only 
take place with sales they made in foreign markets. Furthermore the rationale for 
the Dairy Board – coordination of international sales of small manufacturing 
entities – was weak in the presence of the two large cooperatives that were 
patently capable of such coordination themselves. The two large cooperatives 
were already competing vigorously and seeking competitive advantage for 
whatever prospective change lay in the future. This competition did not facilitate 
their coordiation as dominant owners of the dairy board.  
 
Table 1: Industry Structure as of May 2001  
{
{
ARRANGEMENT ACTIVITY ENTITY and 
OWNERSHIP
INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 
 
 
 
Export 
Marketing 
and 
Distribution 
The Board Milk-Product 
Research & 
Development 
Milk-Product 
Supply Contracts 
   
 Milk-
Product 
Manufacture
4 Co-
operatives 
Milk-Product 
Research & 
Development 
Milk Supply 
 Contracts 
   
 Milk Supply Farmers  
Shareholders  Farmers  
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The following sources of operational problems between the Board and supplying 
companies were identified: 
• Pooling of product returns into a single price for milk (so companies do 
not receive the market price for products that they produce),  
• The cost of reimbursement (so companies did not share in the commercial 
success and failure of products), 
• Large penalties on downgraded product (creating incentive for companies 
to sell product outside the Board if possible), 
• The Board’s marketing priorities differing from those of dairy companies.   
 
The Dairy Board explored various means to resolve these difficulties, but it was 
not successful. Cost allocation models, as an approach to rewarding supplying 
cooperatives, did not provide strong incentives for quality or responsiveness by 
the supplying cooperatives to demands derived from customers. Futhermore if 
these were modified to include quality premia, incentives were created for excess 
production of some products at the expense of others and for destructive 
competition among shareholders (the cooperatives) in the allocation of supply 
contracts. There was also a question of ownership of new intellectual property: 
should it be the Dairy Board or the supplying company that adapts it process to 
supply, even where the origins of the innovation lay with one or other of the 
parties? 
 
In 2001, farmer shareholders in the country’s two largest co-operatives voted for 
the merger of existing co-operatives and the formation of a new co-operative, the 
Global Dairy Company (which later became Fonterra Co-operative Group).  The 
aim of this merger of existing co-operatives was to achieve economies of scale 
and eliminate coordination difficulties that occurred with the existing structure of 
the New Zealand dairy industry.  The Dairy Industry Restructuring Act 2001 
facilitated the change, removing the single seller status of the NZDB and 
authorising the amalgamation of the NZDB and the two largest co-operatives – 
The New Zealand Co-operative Dairy Company Limited and Kiwi Co-operative 
Dairies Limited.  The Act also allowed for the buy-out of shares in the NZDB held 
 11
by The Tatua Co-operative Dairy Company Limited and Westland Co-operative 
Dairy Co Limited, the two small co-operatives that decided not to participate in 
the amalgamation.  Table 2 below illustrates the mergers and acquisitions that 
took place from 1996 to 2001 in the New Zealand dairy industry. 
 
The NZDB’s previous responsibility for international marketing of dairy products, 
was absorbed by the newly formed co-operative.  The obligations of the co-
operative are outlined in the Act and aim to promote the efficient operation of 
dairy markets in New Zealand to ensure New Zealand markets for dairy goods and 
services are contestable.  One of the requirements is open entry to any prospective 
supplier, and open (cost-neutral) exit from the co-operative by shareholding 
farmers, to be enforced by the Commerce Commission.  The Act also required the 
supply of up to 400m litres of raw milk on demand from the co-operative to 
independent processors on competitive terms, under a given formula. 
 
Table 2: Consolidation of the New Zealand Milk Market 
 
Source: Trechter et al (2003,p5) 
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 Fonterra emerged at the end of 2001 as a vertically integrated cooperative taking 
milk from its approximately 13,000 farmers, representing 96% of raw milk 
produced, and delivering almost all of it to consumers in export markets 
worldwide. The majority of New Zealand’s milk is processed into dairy products 
to be exported.  The country’s major dairy exports are milk powder, cheese, 
casein, and butter and the major export markets include the European Union, 
South-East Asia and Latin America.  Fonterra Co-operative Group is New 
Zealand’s largest company and is the world’s largest exporter of dairy products 
(Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2003: 23).  It handles around 98 percent of 
the country’s milk production and its shareholder suppliers make up 95 percent of 
all New Zealand dairy farmers.  Fonterra generates 20 percent of the country’s 
export receipts and seven percent of GDP.10  Fonterra supplies consumers in 140 
countries and has over 30 manufacturing plants in other countries as well as the 25 
it has in New Zealand.  The United States is Fonterra’s largest export market, 
generating over US$500 million annually. Asia is the company’s largest revenue-
earning export region. Fonterra was in 2002 the 4th largest dairy company in terms 
of sales and the 2nd largest in terms of milk processed and has very substantial 
investments in joint ventures. 
 
Issues in the 2001 Restructuring 
 
In addition to the status quo which was, for the reasons given above, most unlikely 
to be sustainable, the prime competing model of reform was to remove the single-
desk export restriction and thereby enable any cooperative, and perhaps investor-
owned firm, to compete in export markets, to integrate the Dairy Board with one 
of the large cooperatives and that cooperative to buy out the interests of other 
cooperatives in the Board. This industry model was not supported by the farmers. 
They sought continuity and held the view that performance in foreign markets 
would benefit from the larger company. The alternative model had the potential to 
produce disruption because the Dairy Board had no formal contracts between it 
                                                 
10 See Fonterra website – http://www.fonterra.com
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and the supplying companies that could have served as the basis of  compensating 
the cooperative that would go it alone.11 It would be difficult enough to meld the 
competing cooperatives into one merged entity: the disruption of the industry with 
competing cooperatives that were arguing over property rights to marketing and 
production arrangements would have been even greater. Furthermore, it may have 
limited the extent to which the single-desk was eliminated: with one large 
cooperative needing to develop its marketing arm a clean removal of the single-
desk may not have been politically feasible. 
 
The policy issues relating to the form of structural change ultimately considered 
included: 
• The effect on prices received resulting from export competition that might 
arise once the single desk was removed, 
• The effect on productive efficiency of processing in New Zealand, 
• Improved coordination of product production and sales,  
• The pricing of milk to farmers and its effect on resource use, and 
• The dominance of Fonterra in the domestic market for milk, given that it 
processes some 96% of total milk produced. 
 
Some considered that the Dairy Board had market power in foreign markets and 
that removing the single-desk would result in New Zealand export competition 
lowering prices of New Zealand product. But the fact that the Dairy Board was a 
monopsonistic purchaser did not give it market power in its output markets. 
Although New Zealand’s share of interational trade was of the order of 30% it 
cannot have held much market power because its share of trade in any specific 
foreign market was very small. It can be expected that particular product and 
market development may transitorily confer higher margins, as in any business, 
but this does not consitute market power. The Dairy Board’s ability to direct 
product to different markets at short notice and thereby take advantage of price 
differentials arising for all sorts of reasons is also not a reason for the presumption 
                                                 
11  Indeed, there was dispute about the value of the Dairy Board paid to the two very small cooperatives that 
opted to go it alone. 
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of market power: indeed, the dairy market is much more affected by the disposal 
and pricing policies of administered markets than the export of New Zealand 
product.  The benefits of improved coordination of production and sales was a 
benefit of the vertically integrated monopoly, but it was argued that the merger of 
the two large cooperatives into a single firm would inhibit competition and 
thereby the productivity performance of domestic processing. The removal of the 
single-desk restriction opened entry possibilities to other firms, and this, and 
competition from alternative uses of the land would impose performance 
constraints on Fonterra. There has been some entry since October 2002 but it is 
negligible in relation to the size of Fonterra. Nevertheless, Fonterra’s performance 
– at least in terms of aggregate payout per kiligram of milk solids is vigorously 
benchmarked against the two very small cooperatives and farmers.12 The small 
amount of entry in the two years since the reform does not imply that Fonterra can 
be less than vigilant in its manufacturing performance. The adoption of fair-value-
share pricing and accompanying regulations have the effect of generating 
competitive threat from within the company. 
 
Fair-value share pricing entails Fonterra’s production, distribution and marketing 
being valued (to date by Standard and Poor’s) to produce a valuation of the 
company from the point of entry of raw milk. This value is then annualised and 
allocated between retained earnings and dividend computed as the return to 
farmers from their investment in Fonterra “the manufacturing company”. This 
return per kg. of milks solids (of raw milk) is then subtracted from total sales to 
give a price for the raw milk (termed by Fonterra, the commodity milk price) 
supplied by farmers. Although farmers are paid per kg. of milk solids their 
dividend on milk product manufacturing and the raw milk price, the valuation and 
availability of shares solves the “excess production” problem of the earlier 
                                                 
12  In 2002 and 2003 the two small cooperatives had signifcantly higher payouts than Fonterra: but in 2004 the 
position was reversed. Tatua was held to have an advantage over  Fonterra in that a larger share of its output 
related to value added manufacture. Westland, at least in 2002 and 2003, contracted to distribute through 
Fonterra’s network. It should be noted that returns to any New Zealand export company will depend upon 
volatile factors that include agricultural policies and cross exchange rates so any comparison of returns 
requires careful identification of their causal factors. 
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approach to bundling.13 Because farmers that leave the company are entitled to 
take their capital in the company with them a tension is imposed on management 
that incentivises performance. Entering farmers, or farmers expanding their milk 
production, have to purchase the requisit capital from Fonterra. In this way the 
costs and benefits of entry and exit lie with the farmers and the performance of 
Fonterra.14 Although, fair-value share pricing is calculated independently of the 
company by and agent overseen by the shareholder council, the process provides 
and incentive for Fonterra to desire that is accurately as possible provides the 
wholesale price of milk in New Zealand, that reflects the marginal value of 
additional milk solids for processing and export. 15
 
Fair-value share pricing, the ability for farmers to exit, regulations that require 
Fonterra to accept all entrants (subject to some transport-cost requirements), and 
regulations that require Fonterra to provide up to 400m litres of milk upon 
application at approximately the price Fonterra pays its suppliers, combine to limit 
any market power that Fonterra holds in the domestic raw milk market by virtue 
of its dominant position. There remains the potentiality of the application of 
market power in the domestic market although this is limited by competition law 
and the position of farmer-suppliers in Fonterra.16
 
The restructuring of the dairy industry highlighted the importance of the judicious 
application of competition law. New Zealand is a small open economy that 
depends upon trade for its real income. It has very small, and therefore naturally 
oligopolistic, industries.17 The evaluation of trade practices and mergers in such 
an economy requires assessing the full set of benefits and costs: that is, it requires 
                                                 
13  Indeed, fair-value share pricing also addresses the cooperative governance problem arising from 
heterogeity of members, see Evans and Guthrie (2002). 
14  If more than a certain percentage of farmers leave in a year limitations are placed upon the amount of 
capital they can immediately take. 
15  Fonterra has an elected shareholder council that is separate from the company Board and which has the 
task of scrutinising the company and reporting to shareholders, independently of the Board. 
16  For example, Fonterra’s milk pricing to groups of farmers is constrained by the ability of its own 
shareholder farmers to leave if it is to their advantage. Also, it is noteworthy that the viability of cooperative 
structures depends on the homogeneity of the product transacted and the proposition of equal treatment of 
members. Thus, Fonterra may be constrained in price differentials it can make available to farmers that differ 
in cost, for example, transport costs, and in the presence of localised competitive threats.  
17  See, Arnold, Boles de Boer and Evans (2003). 
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assessment of the sum of producer and consumer measures of welfare over time. 
To exclude producers’ surplus from the evaluation, as can occur in the USA, 
would in New Zealand’s small open economy ignore any potential benefits from 
exporting, and lessen weight placed upon dynamic economic efficiency. In 1999 
the Commerce Commission had studied a dairy merger proposal similar to that 
which was approved by legislation in 200118 and issued a draft decision that had 
found that detriments exceeded benefits to a very considerable extent: of course, 
given that proposed combined entity would have exported approximately 96% of 
its production, very small gains per unit in international marketing, production and 
distribution would have swamped detriments relating to the domestic market. 
Even if there were some domestic milk product manufacturing inefficiencies that 
were assessed to reduce these gains, the economic basis for denial of merger 
would have been odd, in that it would have essentially been that Commerce 
Commission had a different assessment of the private costs and benefits of the 
merger than the owners had. To illustrate, suppose that 100% of the  output were 
to be exported then the private benefits and costs would have been exactly public 
benefits and costs, and the Commission would simply have been assessing the 
private calculus of these. In fact, 96% would have been exported and there existed 
some domestic market costs, but the point remains that the Commerce 
Commission took an alternative view of costs and benefits that, to a large extent, 
the owners had every incentive to estimate accurately.  
 
A key element in the competition law evaluation was the fact that it was 
cooperatives that were merging. Because they return profits to their 
supplier/shareholders their behaviour would be different from investor-owned 
firms: indeed, the main potential market power problem to be considered in the 
wholesale market was that of excluding potential suppliers, in a situation where 
arguably economies of scale might preclude the establishment of competing 
                                                 
18  The 1999 proposal did not have a settled management structure, agreement about the relative valuesof the 
merging entities and did not emphsise the synergy issues of coordination of marketing, distribution and 
production to the extent of the 2001 proposal. 
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cooperatives.19  The 2001 merger proposal to form (ultimately) Fonterra was 
never placed before the Commerce Commission. It differed somewhat from the 
1999 proposal in its use of fair-value share pricing, and the accompanying 
behavioural restrictions; in particular the open entry and exit of suppliers under 
the terms described above and the requirement to supply an amount of wholesale 
milk.20 These restrictions were specified as regulations under the 2001 Dairy 
Industry Restructuring Act (DIRA) that enabled the formation of (ultimately) 
Fonterra conditional upon the vote of the two large cooperatives that would 
merge.21 Such behavoural undertakings were not available to the Commerce 
Commission had it assessed the proposal: ironically, the Commission was 
designated as the dairy regulator of these behavioural restrictions as part of the 
DIRA. Thus, competition law as routinely administered was not viewed as 
adequate, or sufficiently all-encompassing, to adjudicate on a change of the 
magnitude and nature of the restructuring of the dairy industry as a whole.22  
 
Other issues associated with the change in structure related to the fact that the 
merged entity would not have all dairy farmers as suppliers, and hence activities 
such as populating and maintaining a dairy animal genetic database,  research 
services, supplying advisory, and genetic propogation services then required rules 
as to their ownership and access. It was deemed that the database had public good 
elements that rendered broad access to it beneficial and the other activities private 
in nature.23   
 
                                                 
19  In fact the existence of economies of scale sufficient to preclude entry is arguable on empirical grounds 
and not defensible where value-added products are produced.  Also the existence of economies of scale would 
generally not be sufficient for this behaviour some power in output markets would also be required. 
20  To enhance competition in the New Zealand retail milk market the merged entity was also required to 
divest one of the local fresh milk product distribution companies that the two merging cooperatives owned: 
the Commerce Commission could have taken this step. 
21  The behavioural restrictions remain in place providing Fonterra’s market share remains above a threshold 
that is of the order of 85% of raw milk processed. 
22  The critically deregulatory part of the DIRA was the removal of the statutory single-desk restriction: an 
action that the Commerce Commission could not have of itself implemented, but it could have assessed the 
merger under the advisement of the Government that the removal of the single desk was part of the merger 
package. 
23  For detailed discussion see Evans and Quigley (2001). 
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 The Dairy Industry From 2001 
 
On the regulatory front, New Zealand’s quota access to markets had since their 
inception in the late 1950s been administered through the New Zealand Dairy 
Board. Under the DIRA these rights were allocated to the merged entity 
(Fonterra). Depending  on the designated market, this allocation begins to expire 
from 2007, at which  point the government will need to specify the rights for 
further periods. There will likely be other regulations of a more generic form 
across all agriculture relating to environmental and genetic modification issues 
and the control of disease. 
 
From the industry perspective evolution will depend upon the performance of 
Fonterra and the associated entry and growth of competitors. There exist two 
competing cooperatives and some competition from other entrants, although the 
share of milk processed by Fonterra has not declined. The ability for other firms to 
export is less than two years old: but a range of companies other than Fonterra, 
Tatua and Westland are exporting. An investor processing firm is being 
established and another fresh-milk-product company has been established in 
association with a supermarket.  
 
The throughput of Fonterra has continued to grow (see Table 3, and Figures A3 
and A7) and dairy farms have continued to expand their scale. However, we can 
now be sure that such growth is on its economic merits, relative to other uses of 
the resources employed.24 The structure of Fonterra as a cooperative can be 
expected to undergo continual scrutiny as the market evolves. It has recently 
announced moves joint venture to strengthen its position as a food services 
company. 
 
 
                                                 
24  Subject always to regulations that affect all agriculture and other industry:  for example, biosecurity and 
environmental regulation. 
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Table 3: Growth in Milk Processing Volumes 
 Milk 
processed 
Milkfat 
processed 
Protein 
processed 
Milksolids 
processed 
 (million litres) (million kg) (million kg) (million kg) 
1974/75 5,222 244 181 425 
1981/82 5,979 282 209 491 
2001/02 12,998 631 476 1,107 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (2003) 
 
It currently manages the full supply-retail chain from the farm gate to products 
and ingredients including health, nutrition and convenience food, as well as more 
standard milk powders, cheeses and butter.25 As mentioned, it was in 2002 the 4th 
largest dairy company in terms of sales and the 2nd largest in terms of milk 
processed. Fonterra had in 2002 three divisions: NZMP (in 2002 the largest dairy 
ingrediants company in the world, encompassing collection to ingredients), New 
Zealand Milk ( marketing consumer goods and services) and Fonterra Enterprises 
responsible for venture and growth businesses. Fonterra has secured its growth 
and diversification with the assistance of very substantial investments in joint 
venture  arrangements that reflect its comparative and strategic advantages. 
The question remains whether the company as a cooperative with shareholding 
tied to amount of product supplied, is ideally structured for such vast enterprise. 
The governance and cost of capital issues that are part of a comparison of 
cooperative and investor firms are discused in various places.26 It may mean that 
Fonterra evolves to some combination of investor and supplier ownership since 
aspects of its business may be viewed differently.27 There is not space here to 
review the issues, but there is no need to. The environment created by the 
formation of Fonterra is one in which the appropriate institutional form evolves in 
response to product, ownership and managerial market pressures. There is no case 
                                                 
25 For a review of Fonterra’s activities and investments on other countries and entities see Goldberg and 
Porraz (2002) 
26 See Evans and Quigley (2001) on capital structure and Trecher (2003) who compares the approach 
represented by Fonterra to the Australian Wheat Board, more investor orientated approach to deregulation. 
27  Indeed, the company does list interest bearing notes and thereby draw scrutiny from parties outside its 
ownership, which is but one of the issues in comparing the cooperative-investor form.  
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to argue that these pressures, or their interaction, are such that regulatory oversight 
or strictures of this process would be socially beneficial. 
 
Summary 
 
New Zealand dairy farmers and processors have not received price or income 
support since before the 1990s. Since 2002 there has been no restriction on dairy 
processing firms exporting from New Zealand. In consequence, the only 
restriction on dairy processing firm entry is competition from Fonterra which is 
dominant in the New Zealand market but which is subject to behavioural 
restrictions, and the internal tensions of supplier open entry and exit.  
 
There has been some, quantitatively very small, entry to dairy processing, and 
Fonterra has expanded significantly. Milk production has continued to grow in 
New Zealand, at  least since the advent of fair-value share pricing, reflecting the 
profitability of dairying relative to other uses of land, labour and capital. It, and 
the performance of other agricultural sectors, demonstrate the viability of 
agriculture  and better resource use flowing from de-regulation. The extent of 
financial viability will  reflect the profitability of agriculture within the New 
Zealand economy, and will not carry over to all markets on deregulation. 
 
The structural change process was accepted in the 1980s by farmers as a political 
interest group because it was part of economy-wide de-regulation: in New 
Zealand farmers thought that they would ultimately benefit from de-regulation. 
The structural change in agriculture  has been very considerable and it took a long 
period to adjust. Product mix changed a lot and the more (New Zealand) 
traditional forms of agriculture took quite some time to adjust; but they are now 
quite innovative and viable. 
 
The second round of structural adjustment in dairy in 2001 was driven by forces 
within the industry as well as the need to recognise that the world had changed 
and that policy should reflect this. In dairy the deregulatory option chosen was one 
desired by the farmers and that preserved critcal elements of the status quo: in 
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particular, the cooperative structure and a large entity operating in world markets. 
This created an environment that allows competition and a transition to a form of 
entity, or entities, that evolve according to  the demands of product, service, 
managerial and ownership markets. Such market endogenous evolution of 
organisational structures is desirable where possible; in contrast to a sudden “big 
bang” deregulatory approach that has attendant disruptions of transactions and 
imposes a view of the right organisational institution.  
 
Competition was important to the structural change of regulations in 2001, but the 
institution of competition law was not well suited to managing a change of such 
different nature from it usual business as the one proposed for the dairy industry. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure A1 
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Data sourced from MAF. 
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Figure A2 
Horticultural Land
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Data sourced from MAF. 
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Figure A3 
Dairy Profitability and Performance
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Data sourced from MAF. 
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Figure A4 
Sheep & Beef Profitability
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Figure A5 
Revenue per Stock Unit
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03p 2003-04e
Year
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
(
$
)
Sheep Revenue per su Beef Revenue per su
 
Data sourced from The Economic Service, Sheep and Beef Farm Survey. 
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Figure A6 
FOB (Nominal) Product Values
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Data sourced from MAF, 10 Year Statistics. 
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Figure A7 
Agriculture
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Data sourced from Meat New Zealand Statistics. 
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Figure A8 
Plantation Forest
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Data sourced from MAF. 
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Figure A9 
Total Production - Lamb, Mutton, Beef
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